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THE CURRENT LAW OF PATENTS
FOR COMPUTER SOFTWARE:
OR BENSON REVISITED
by John T. Roberts*
INTRODUCTION

Have judicial decisions in recent years helped answer whether new
methods of operating a computing machine should receive different
patent protection than new methods of operating any other machine?'
Have those who, since the early 1960's, openly opposed the patenting of
computer software made any progress? Have those who urge its acceptance made any progress? Have those who seek only clarification of the
law made any progress? In mid-1978, the answer to each of these
questions must be largely in the negative.
One court, the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals,' has struggled
repeatedly with the question of program patentability. It has, since In
re Benson,3 found statutory and patentable the software4 inventions of
Johnston,5 Noll, 6 Chatfield, 7 Deutsch and Flook. 9 It has found unpat* B.S. 1957, Massachusetts Institute of Technology; L.L.B. 1961, University of
Virginia. Mr. Roberts is a member of the bars of the District of Columbia and the
Commonwealth of Virginia, registered before the Patent and Trademark Office,
and a member of the law firm of Irons and Sears, P.C., Washington, D.C.
1. This issue was addressed by the majority in In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152,
157, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 734, 6 CLSR 52,59 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 195
U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Chatfield].
2. The Court of Customs and Patent Appeals will hereinafter be cited as
"C.C.P.A."

3. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 2 CLSR 1030 (C.C.P.A. 1971),
rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256
(1972). The Supreme Court decision in this case will hereinafter sometimes be cited
as Benson.
4. The first appearance of this word demands an acknowledgment of definitional problems. The largest problem is that there are more concepts than words
and few agreed-upon definitions. Lawyers ought to feel quite comfortable with this
situation.
5. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765,183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974),
rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976).
6. In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 6 CLSR 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977) [hereinafter cited as Noll].
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entable the inventions of Christensen, ° Waldbaum," Richman 2 and de
Castelet. 13 This article will undertake the hazardous task of rationalizing these decisions.
During this period the Patent and Trademark Office has rejected
software patents on the broad grounds that "the law . . . where the
invention resides in a program servicing a computer is clearly settled by
. . . Benson' 4 and "the thrust [of Benson is] that computer programs
5 Yet, the Patent
. . are not patentable."'
Office has issued, in its new
6
software class,' about two hundred patents. 7 A review of these patents
suggests that the above-stated "settled law" has not been uniformly
applied. The Patent Office has also strongly defended disclosure rejections in such cases as In re Knowlton, 8 In re Comstock, 9 In re Brandstadter,20 and In re Doyle,21 where one or more subject matter rejections would have seemed appropriate.
Since late 1976, the Patent Office has suspended the prosecution of
software patent applications while awaiting clarification of the law by
the United States Supreme Court.22 As this is being written, there are
*

On July 5, 1977, the assignee, Bell Laboratories, Inc. had formally abandoned the
application, and filed a suggestion of mootness. Justice Blackmun indicated that he
would grant review, vacate and remand the case for dismissal on grounds of
mootness. 348 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at A-1 (Oct. 6,1977).
7. 545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 6 CLSR 52 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977) (untimely filed).
The jurisdictional statute requires the filing of an application for writ of certiorari within ninety days after the "judgment or decree." 28 U.S.C. § 2101(c) (1970).
Alone among the federal appellate courts, the C.C.P.A. has neither formality. The
petition was filed timely from the date of the mandate, but untimely from the date
of the opinion.
8. In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 193 U.S.P.Q. 645, 6 CLSR 408 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
9. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195 U.S.P.Q. 9, 6 CLSR 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd,
Parker v. Flook, - U.S. -, No. 77-642 (June 22, 1978).
10. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392,178 U.S.P.Q. 35,4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
11. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611,194 U.S.P.Q. 465,6 CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
12. In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 195 U.S.P.Q. 340 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
13. In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 195 U.S.P.Q. 439 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
14. Quoting from an examiner's answer known to the author.
15. Quotingfrom the Board's opinion in Chatfield.
16. Originally Class 444, now Class 364, subclass 300.
17. As of April 1978, there were 493 references in this subclass; one hundred
and four patents and seventy-six defensive publications have issued in this class,
and the remainder have been cross-referenced.
18. 481 F.2d 1357, 1362-63,178 U.S.P.Q. 486, 489-90,4 CLSR 799,806-08 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
19. 481 F.2d 905, 908-09, 178 U.S.P.Q. 616, 618-20, 4 CLSR 818, 821-23 (C.C.P.A.
1973).

20. 484 F.2d 1395, 1400-05, 179 U.S.P.Q. 286, 289-93,4 CLSR 976,982-91 (C.C.P.A.
1973).
21. 482 F.2d 1385, 1389, 179 U.S.P.Q. 227,230,4 CLSR 933, 939-40 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
22. The Patent Office originally ignored the holdings of Noll and Chatfield on
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between 600 and 900 software applications currently pending before
the examiners and Patent Office Board of Appeals, with 450 being filed
yearly. 23 There are also several cases pending before the C.C.P.A., in25
cluding In re Toma 24 and In re Johnson.
From this state of affairs, two consequences are clear. First, that
any software patent issuing in the next several years is likely to be for
an invention conceived over a decade ago, thereby extending the duration of coverage of the patent and making potentially far more valuable
the patent grant. 26 Second, that the validity of any of these patents will
be uncertain for years to come.
Since 1972, applicants, attorneys, examiners and judges have
struggled with the equally cryptic discovery of one Gary Benson2 7 and
writings of one William Douglas. 28 What exactly was the invention or
contribution of Benson? What was the exclusive right requested? Why
was it denied? Despite explicit judicial requests for reconsideration of
its holding in Gottschalk v. Benson,2 9 the Supreme Court, for six years,
the ground the decisions were not final. Since October 3, 1977, the Patent Office has
taken the unique position that the disposition of Noll was equivalent to a reversal
and that Chatfield may likewise be ignored since the reasons given for denial of
the petition indicated that it would have been accepted and the holding below
reversed if the Court, jurisdictionally, could have done so. However, the opposite
conclusion appears equally tenable.
23. This was the Patent Office's own estimate, reported in Petition of the
Solicitor General, Parker v. Flook, No. 77-642, filed November 2, 1977, reprinted in
354 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at D-1, D-3 n.12 (Nov. 17, 1977). See also,
Bigelow, Patents: U S. Supreme Court to Review Flook, 4 COMPUTER L. & TAX.
REP., Feb. 1978, at 2. A further indication of this backlog is the fact that the recently
decided Noll case (545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 6 CLSR 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977)), was fully briefed before the
Patent Office Board of Appeal prior to November, 1972.
24. In re Toma, 77-554, a method for translating from Russian to English,
argued before the C.C.P.A. in October, 1977.[Ed. Note: On May 18, 1978, the
C.C.P.A. held the method in Toma to be patentable subject matter. See, Method of
Operating Computer to TranslateBetween Natural Languages Held Patentable
Subject Matter,380 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at A-16 (May 25, 1978).]
25. In re Johnson, 76-717, 76-718, 76-719, involving the analysis of seismic data,
argued in January, 1978.
26. A similar situation arose with radar patents, first delayed by World War II,
and later held up by endless interferences caused, in large part, by the initial delay.
Many patents on pre-war radar inventions are only now expiring.
27. As described in In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682,682-84, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548,548-49, 2
CLSR 1030, 1031-33 (C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
28. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
29. See, e.g., In re Chatfield, 545 F.2d 152, 161-62, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 738, 6 CLSR
52, 67-68 (C.C.P.A. 1976) (Rich & Lane, J.J., dissenting); In re Johnston, 502 F.2d
765, 774, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 179, 4 CLSR 1491, 1508 (C.C.P.A. 1974) (Rich, J., dissenting), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133
(1976).
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declined to do so.30 Finally, on January 16, 1978, the Court accepted the
petition of the Solicitor General in Parker v. Flook, and issued its
decision reversing the C.C.P.A., on June 22, 1978. 31
I.

THE UNSTATED ISSUES

Three issues are subliminally present in every patent case, particularly a software patent case: (1) the economic philosophy of the patent
system, (2) retrospective limitations on the patent grant, and (3) prospective limitations on the patent grant. They each deserve identification and discussion since each is of constitutional dimension and clearly
affects every decision.
A.

The Economic Philosophy of the Patent System

Do patents for inventions advance or impede the progress of the
useful arts? Thomas Jefferson himself first opposed, then supported the
patent system. 32 The Supreme Court in Mazer v. Stein33 stated: "The
30. In Dann v. Johnston, supra the Supreme Court reversed on the sole ground
of obviousness, while observing that its Benson opinion was "limited." 425 U.S. at
224, 189 U.S.P.Q. at 259, 5 CLSR at 1137. In Chatfield (as well as Noll), the Court
denied the petitions of the Government on grounds other than the merits. See notes
6 & 7 supra.
31. - U.S. -, No. 77-642 (June 22, 1978). [Ed. Note: See Postscript infra, at page
104.]
32. As stated by Justice Clark in Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 7-8, 148
U.S.P.Q. 459, 463 (1966):
Jefferson, like other Americans, had an instinctive aversion to monopolies. It was a monopoly on tea that sparked the Revolution and Jefferson certainly did not favor an equivalent form of monopoly under the new
government. His abhorrence of monopoly extended initially to patents as
well. From France, he wrote to Madison (July 1788) urging a Bill of Rights
provision restricting monopoly, and as against the argument that limited
monopoly might serve to incite "ingenuity," he argued forcefully that "the
benefit even of limited monopolies is too doubtful to be opposed to that of
their general suppression," V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 47 (Ford
ed., 1895).
His views ripened, however, and in another letter to Madison (Aug.
1789) after the drafting of the Bill of Rights, Jefferson stated that he would
have been pleased by an express provision in this form:
"Art. 9. Monopolies may be allowed to persons for their own productions in literature & their own inventions in the arts, for a term not
exceeding-years but for no longer term & no other purpose." Id. at
113.
And he later wrote:
"Certainly an inventor ought to be allowed a right to the benefit of his
invention for some certain time .... Nobody wishes more than I do
that ingenuity should receive a liberal encouragement." Letter to Oliver Evans (May 1807), V Writings of Thomas Jefferson, at 75-76 (Washington ed.).
As if anticipating a still current semantic debate, Jefferson initially opposed patents as monopolies, and then approved them as encouragement
for ingenuity.
33. 347 U.S. 201, 100 U.S.P.Q. 325 (1954).
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economic philosophy behind the [constitutional clause] ... is the conviction that encouragement of individual effort by personal gain is the
best way to advance public welfare through the talents of authors and
inventors in 'Science and useful Arts.' ,,14 Just two years ago a Justice
Department spokesman opined that virtually everyone supports the
35
principle of patents for inventions.
Expressing the contrary position, however, a presidential commission studying the patent system recommended in 1966 that software not
be patentable. This result was reached, in part, because the commission
concluded that "the creation of programs has undergone substantial
and satisfactory growth" without patent protection.3" The government,
in its Flook petition, echoed this conclusion by stating that the patenting of software would have a "debilitating effect on development of
the computer industry."3 7 The evidence cited to support this statement
was a fifteen to twenty percent annual growth rate and a current $1.5
billion volume in the software industry. 38 Yet, it is a fallacy to equate
effort with progress. Indeed, one could equally argue that these statistics show that software development is both inefficient and repetitive.
It is also a nonsequitur to urge that a substantial growth rate in an
industry without patent protection demonstrates that patent protection
is unnecessary or undesirable. For example, the petroleum industry has
recently enjoyed an even greater growth in dollar volume than the
software industry, but that does not imply that an economical method
of extracting oil from shale will be discovered sooner if the Patent
Office denies coverage to that class of inventions.
When a person cites these reasons to justify denial of protection to a
particular class of inventions, it is as likely that he doubts the value of
patents generally as that he believes this restricted class of inventions
ought not to enjoy patent protection.
B. Retrospective Limitations on the Patent Grant
The second constitutional issue, retrospective limitations on the
patent grant, was addressed by the United States Supreme Court in
Graham v. Deere.39 In Graham, the Court found a limitation on the
power granted Congress under Article I, § 8 of the United States
Constitution,4" holding that Congress could not grant patents "whose
34. Id. at 219, 100 U.S.P.Q. at 333.

35. Almost no one questions that a completely free market for innovations
would result in a less than optimum level of innovative activity ....
Speech by Donald A. Farmer, Special Assistant to the Assistant Attorney General,
Antitrust Division, Feb. 20, 1976.
36. REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM 13 (1966).
37. Petition of the Solicitor General, supra note 23, at D-3.

38. Id. at D-3 n.13.
39. 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
40. U. S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8:
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effects are to remove existent knowledge from the public domain
"141

This issue, reflected in the novelty and nonobviousness requirements of patent law, 42 is usually not addressed explicitly in software
cases. However, it always seems to be present. As the C.C.P.A. noted
recently in In re Warmus,4 3 the Patent Office Board of Appeals in that
case had found subject matter deficiencies relevant in its discussion of
obviousness. Yet, this mistake is not limited to the Board. In Flook
there was no rejection on novelty grounds-the Patent Office admitted
that the invention was novel and unobvious; yet, the government's brief
to the Supreme Court asserted that the application should be rejected
44
for lack of invention.
In Benson, a similar attack was made. The applicant elected to take
the wholly accurate, but in the author's view quite inadvisable, position
that novelty and obviousness were not in issue.4 5 It would appear safer
for an applicant to always assume that he has the burden of persuasion
on the question of whether he has made a worthwhile contribution to
the art, although this is quite difficult in an appeal to the C.C.P.A. 46
C. Prospective Limitations on the Patent Grant
The third and most troublesome issue, as stated in Henry J. Kaiser
Co. v. McLouth Steel Corp., 47 is that the Constitution does not permit
an inventor "a monopoly broader than his invention. '48 The question
then is what later inventions are properly covered by a patent? The
many Supreme Court decisions on this issue were summarized in BenThe Congress shall have Power . . .To Promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;...
41. 383 U.S. at 6, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 462.
42. 35 U.S.C. §§ 102, 103 (1970 & Supp. V 1975), reprintedin the Appendix in this
issue.
43. 561 F.2d 816, 195 U.S.P.Q. 234, 6 CLSR 430 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
44. The Government's brief contends that the decision in Funk Bros. Seed Co.
v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280 (1974), requires that the discovery be treated as prior art and that the end use be an "inventive" application.
354 PAT., T.M. & COPYRIGHT J. (BNA), at D-1, D-5 & D-6 (Nov. 17, 1977).
45. In re Benson, 441 F.2d 682, 684, 169 U.S.P.Q. 548, 550, 2 CLSR 1030, 1033
(C.C.P.A. 1971), rev'd sub nom. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 195 U.S.P.Q. 673,
3 CLSR 256 (1972).
46. The judicially-approved evidence of unobviousness (see, Graham v. John
Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966)), e.g., the level of skill in the art, is not
part of the application and is not persuasive if submitted in affidavit form. Furthermore, if the subject matter rejection is withdrawn, it is not needed. At a later
stage, the record is frozen and the introduction of such evidence is not then permitted.
47. 257 F. Supp. 372, 150 U.S.P.Q. 239 (E.D. Mich. 1966), aff'd, 400 F.2d 36, 158
U.S.P.Q. 565 (6th Cir. 1968).
48. Id. at 442, 150 U.S.P.Q. at 295.
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son as holding that ideas, scientific truths, principles, phenomena of
nature, and intellectual concepts are not patentable; only novel struc49
tures or useful applications of them are patentable.
Two quite different, yet valid, propositions are involved in this
holding. The first is that even the discoverer of a concept or property,
such as the telegraph, telephone, directional antenna, or leakproof
battery, may not obtain a monopoly on the concept or property itself;
one can only patent the novel system which carries out the concept or
displays the property. 50 The second proposition is that even if one is the
first to harness a new force, e.g., steam, solar power or atomic energy,
he may not claim an exclusive right over every later system employing
that -force.5
A third, and related, though invalid proposition is that one cannot
patent the useful applications of a discovery. As Justice Frankfurter
observed in Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co.,52 ". . . any
patentable composite exemplifies in its properties 'the laws of nature.'
[Such arguments] could fairly be employed to challenge almost every
patent."5 31 Charles Goodyear discovered a law of nature when he heated
raw rubber and sulfur to form vulcanized rubber. About the same time,
John and Charles Hanson discovered that lead, when recently set,
would reunite. This discovery allowed the production of cheaper and
superior lead pipe. A century later another inventor discovered a new
way of transforming one form of electrical signal to another. All three
inventions involved discoveries of laws of nature. In the first, the patent
was sustained for all uses for vulcanized rubber.5 4 In the second, the
copier of the process secured a free license by convincing the Court that
the patent must be limited to the claimed machine. 55 In the third, the
5
government itself convinced the Court to grant everyone a free license. 1
The stated ground in both of the latter cases was that the latecomers
57
had an absolute right to use the laws of nature.
49. 409 U.S. 63, 67-71, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 675-76, 3 CLSR 256, 259-62 (1972).
50. For instance, Morse did not invent the first telegraph. He did, however,
invent the first long distance telegraph by inventing a relay or voltage amplifier. As
such, his ambitious (and unnecessary) claim to "electromagnetism however developed for ... printing. . .at any distance" was properly denied.
51. The inventor of the first steam engine, Newcomen, could not claim that
Watt's improvement was an infringement. Newcomen achieved power from the
condensation of steam, while Watt achieved power from the generation of steam.
52. 333 U.S. 127, 76 U.S.P.Q. 280 (1947).
53. Id. at 135, 76 U.S.P.Q. at 283.
54. Goodyear v. Day, 10 F. Cas. 678 (C.C.N.J. 1853) (No. 5,568).
55. LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. (55 U.S.) 156 (1852).
56. Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
57. Id. at 72, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262; LeRoy v. Tatham, 14 How. (55
U.S.) 156 (1852).
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Every decision since Benson, 8 and every brief and argument in this
area, has sought to explain the holding,5 9 rationale,6" thrust,6 1 or thinking62 of Benson. Indeed, the Supreme Court itself has joined this chorus
with the singularly ambiguous comment that its Benson holding was
63
"limited.,
Every litigant who has attempted to invoke Benson either in support of or in opposition to patents on software has had to either acknowledge or ignore the contradictory positions taken by the Court
within the opinion itself. Perhaps Benson can best be understood by
focusing upon these anomalies.
It is unlikely that the original draft of the majority opinion
concluded that: (a) processes outside those recognized in prior precedents might be patentable; (b) some computer programs might be patentable; and (c) the holding had nothing to do with analog computers.
The opinion acknowledges that "[i]t is said . . ." that the decision
negates each of these things. 64 Yet, who could have said such things
about an unwritten opinion? It could certainly not have been the parties, the public or the Bar, since none of them had access to, or knowledge of, the internal memoranda and discussions of the Court. These
issues, the author suggests, were probably raised by other Justices of
the Court in criticism of or proposed dissents to the initial draft of the
opinion, and the entire last half of the opinion was probably rewritten
as a compromise to prevent a 4-2 or perhaps even 3-3 split.
It is unusual, in marshalling support for an argument, to state that
something is both tall and short or wide and thin. However, stranger
things are known to happen in order to get unanimity from a committee, a legislature, or even a court. Justice Douglas' position on monopolies is well-known. 65 Thus, it is quite in character for him to condemn
with a rhetorical flourish claims "so abstract and sweeping as to cover
58. 409 U.S. 63, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 3 CLSR 256 (1972).
59. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 23,195 U.S.P.Q. 9,11, 6 CLSR 426, 429-30 (C.C.P.A.
1977), rev'd, Parker v. Flook, - U.S. -, No. 77-642 (June 22, 1978).
60. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 617, 194 U.S.P.Q. 465, 469, 6 CLSR 415, 424
(C.C.P.A. 1977).
61. In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1240, 195 U.S.P.Q. 439, 443 (C.C.P.A. 1977);
In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 774, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 179,4 CLSR 1491, 1507 (C.C.P.A.
1974) (Rich, J., dissenting).
62. In re Noll, 545 F.2d 141, 151, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 729, 6 CLSR 69, 86 (C.C.P.A.
1976) (Lane & Rich, JJ, dissenting).
63. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219, 224,189 U.S.P.Q. 257,259,5 CLSR 1133,1137
(1976).
64. 409 U.S. 63, 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 676, 3 CLSR 256, 262 (1972).
65. My experience ... convinced me that controls on capitalism were obvi-
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both known and unknown uses of the BCD to pure binary conversion."6 6 It is inconsistent, however, for him then to say that the claimed
process covers the only practical use of the algorithm, 67 unless such a
statement is made to secure the concurrence of fellow Justices.
It is rare for any court to squarely overrule its own prior decision or
to admit an error, either factual or legal. In this case it is doubly

unlikely to occur because it is unnecessary-Benson lost.68 The narrowest rule which will support the assumed facts6 9 is that one cannot patent
a mathematical algorithm. Benson was also the "high water mark" for
the broad position that no computer program is patentable. 70 Justice
Douglas specifically indicated that his opinion "[does] not so hold. ' 71
Between these two extremes is a vast range of legal rules, sufficient to
have defeated Benson, but narrow enough to allow patenting of some
software inventions.
When it decides Parkerv. Flook, the Supreme Court may enlighten
everyone as to the true "rule" of Benson. It would be more useful,
however, if the Court simply acknowledged that the Benson holding
was clearer than the "rule," and set forth the "rule" to be applied in
future software patent cases.

III.

SOFTWARE As APPARATUS OR PROCESS
Is an old computer with a new program, an old car with new spark

ously necessary; monopoly power could end all competition Which is the
important ingredient in the free enterprise system. . . . Free enterprise in
the Jeffersonian sense freed the spirit and loosened all men's creative
energies .... I [shared] insight into the corporate world and its chicanery
[and the need] to protect small and medium sized companies.
W. DOUGLAS, Go EAST YOUNG MAN 306, 307, 453 (1974).
66. 409 U.S. at 68, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 675, 3 CLSR at 259.
67. Id. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262.
68. Allowance of claims 8 and 13 was reversed. Id. The Supreme Court opinion
does not avert to the several claims which the Patent Office allowed. To date,
however, no patent has issued to Benson, suggesting that all of the claims were
later rejected by the Patent Office.
69. The rule of any case must be drawn from the facts as they are found by the
court. In Benson, the Court found that the 'process' claim ... may ... be performed ... without any apparatus." Id. at 68, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 675, 3 CLSR at 259.
Record evidence such as the requirement of storing signals in a "reentrant shift
register," if thought by the reader to be inconsistent with the Court's decision, may
have a good deal to do with the correctness of the decision, but nothing to do with
the "rule" of Benson.
70. The opinion stated that the President's Commission on the Patent System in
1966 recommended that software not be patentable. Id. at 72, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 677, 3
CLSR at 262. Curiously, the opinion did not point out that this was a feature of the
1967 Administration patent revision bill (Section 106, S.1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1967), reprinted in the Appendix in this issue), which was withdrawn from further
consideration after substantial criticism from the industry, the bar, and finally, the
Administration itself.
71. 409 U.S. at 71, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262.
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plugs, or an old paper-making machine with an elevated roll, a new
machine? The answer to this question depends upon the answerers'
definition of the term "machine." May a new program be claimed as a
new machine, and does this aid the applicants' cause? These are legal
questions, or at least questions which lawyers must, if asked, attempt to
answer.
Courts are required in software cases to analyze the apparently
mutually exclusive, statutory categories of "process," "machine,"
"manufacture" and "composition of matter" 72 in light of the original
constitutional mandate.7 3 The results of this analysis may take the Bar
by surprise.
In In re Prater,74 the court rejected the process claims as not limited
to a machine process. 75 It then allowed the apparatus claims, solely on
the basis that there were no "mental steps" involved, since the entire
operation was performed by machine. 76 The same year, in In re Bernhart,77 the court allowed a "system" claim. The only rejection was for
obviousness, 78 although the Patent Office also raised the question of
novelty. 79 The C.C.P.A. held that such machines were statutory subject
matter.8 0
Method claims were approved in In re Mahony 81 and In re Musgrave.8 2 The latter opinion noted that operational steps in the technological arts made the method a statutory process.8 3 Benson also
84
contained only method claims.
85
Method, use and apparatus claims were presented in In re Foster.
The court, citing Musgrave, found that all three types of claims were
directed to statutory subject matter. However, the court then rejected
the method claims on the ground that the term "signals," as used in
such claims, included visible signals which could be manually manipu72. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970), reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
73. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8, quoted in note 40 supra.
74. 415 F.2d 1393, 162 U.S.P.Q. 541, 2 CLSR 32 (C.C.P.A. 1969), superseding,415
F.2d 1378, 159 U.S.P.Q. 583, 2 CLSR 8 (C.C.P.A. 1968).
75. Id. at 1404, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 550, 2 CLSR at 48.
76. Id. at 1406, 162 U.S.P.Q. at 52, 2 CLSR at 51.
77. 417 F.2d 1395, 163 U.S.P.Q. 611, 2 CLSR 359 (C.C.P.A. 1969). The court
correctly noted that the changes are invisible to the eye, and that its memory
elements are differently arranged. The court concluded that if it is not a new
machine, it is certainly a "new and useful improvement." Id. at 1400,163 U.S.P.Q.
at 616, 2 CLSR at 366.
78. Id. at 1401, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 617, 2 CLSR at 368.
79. Id. at 1398, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 614-15, 2 CLSR at 363.
80. Id. at 1400, 163 U.S.P.Q. at 616, 2 CLSR at 367.
81. 421 F.2d 742, 164 U.S.P.Q. 572, 2 CLSR 587 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
82. 431 F.2d 882, 167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 2 CLSR 920 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
83. Id. at 893, 167 U.S.P.Q. at 289-90, 2 CLSR at 938.
84. 409 U.S. 63, 64, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 674, 3 CLSR 256, 256-57.
85. 438 F.2d 1011, 169 U.S.P.Q. 99, 2 CLSR 994 (C.C.P.A. 1971).
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lated,8 6 and that the specification therefore claimed more than what the
"applicant regards as his invention."8 7 This holding rendered as dicta 88
the prior statement that the method claims were statutory subject
matter. 89 The use and apparatus claims were allowed.90
In re Christensen,91 decided after Benson, presented a method
claim with a mathematical equation as its novel feature. The court did
not discuss the "technological arts" standard of Musgrave,92 but simply
held that Benson precluded a claim where its novelty was the solution
93
of a mathematical equation as the final step.
Only apparatus claims were presented in In re Johnston." The
Board had found them non-statutory on the ground that a patent on
the apparatus would grant Johnston a monopoly over a method of
banking.9 5 The C.C.P.A. reversed the Board, finding that "[r]ecordkeeping machine systems are clearly within the 'technological arts."' 9
The majority rejected the Solicitor's suggestion that Benson was logically applicable. 97 It noted that Benson involved process claims, while
Johnston involved apparatus claims, and that Johnston encompassed
neither a law of nature, a mathematical formula, nor an algorithm. 8
Judge Rich dissented on the ground that the invention was a new
program and Benson precluded patents on such inventions.99 He further asserted that the majority opinion distinguished Benson on the basis
of form, and not substance. 100
In In re Noll, 10 1 the majority again limited Benson to process
(method) claims, finding the decision inapplicable to the machine
claims presented. 0 2 The court distinguished between how an applicant
86. Id. at 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 102, 2 CLSR at 1001.
87. Id.
88. Dicta is defined as "opinions of a judge which do not embody the resolution
or determination of the court." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 540 (4th rev. ed. 1968).
89. 438 F.2d at 1015, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 101, 2 CLSR at 999.
90. Id. at 1016, 169 U.S.P.Q. at 102, 2 CLSR at 1001-02. Thus it would appear that
these are better categories for software claims.
91. 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35, 4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).
92. 431 F.2d 882, 893, 167 U.S.P.Q. 280, 289, 2 CLSR 920, 938 (C.C.P.A. 1970).
93. 478 F.2d at 1394, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 37, 4 CLSR at 69-70.
94. 502 F.2d 765, 765-67, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 173-74,4 CLSR 1491, 1492-96 (C.C.P.A.
1974), rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219,189 U.S.P.Q. 257,5 CLSR 1133
(1976).
95. Id. at 768, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 175, 4 CLSR at 1497.
96. Id. at 771, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 176, 4 CLSR at 1501. (Emphasis in original.)
97. Id. at 771, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 177, 4 CLSR at 1502.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 773, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 179, 4 CLSR at 1506 (Rich, J., dissenting).
100. Id.
101. 545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 6 CLSR 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977).
102. Id. at 149, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 727, 6 CLSR at 81.
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perceives his invention, e.g., a new program, and how he presents it,
e.g., a machine claim." 3 This case and the companion case of In re
Chatfield,'0 involving method claims, were each decided by 3-2 majorities. Judges Lane and Rich dissented in both cases on the basis that
claiming a machine, as opposed to a process, was merely the "drafter's
105
choice" and that both were equally proscribed by Benson.
Judge Rich's dissent in Chatfield traced the history of the section
101 statutory categories from 1790 to 1952, and stated that the 1952
formulation of categories was a "mere modernization of language and a
declaration of existing case law."' 6 Yet, if one considers that "useful
arts" was the only category of patentable subject matter specifically set
forth in the Constitution, the 1790 formulation of patentable subject
matter-"any useful art, manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or
any improvement therein"-drafted by the very signatories to the
Constitution, could not have meant to include, as a first subclass, useful
arts which were neither manufactures, engines, machines or devices.
Nor could it have meant to include subclasses of manufactures, engines,
machines or devices which were not useful arts. It could have meant
only to state useful arts, e.g., manufactures, engines, machines, devices
or improvements thereon. The initial category-"useful arts"-was allinclusive. The additional categories must be seen as exemplary only,
and not exclusive, or even mutually exclusive. An engine is today, as it
was in 1790, first a manufacture, second a machine, third a device, and
fourth an improvement on prior engines.
The 1952 Patent Act substituted the term "process" for the prior
103. Id. at 147, 197 U.S.P.Q. at 725-26, 6 CLSR at 78-79.
104. 545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 6 CLSR 52 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977).
105. Id. at 161,191 U.S.P.Q. at 738, 6 CLSR at 67 (Rich & Lane, JJ., dissenting); In
re Noll, 545 F.2d 141,152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 729, 6 CLSR 69, 86-87 (Lane & Rich, JJ.,
dissenting), cert. denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977).
106. The categories of patentable inventions named in § 101 are an evolution
from the first patent act of 1790 where they were named as "any useful art,
manufacture, engine, machine, or device, or any improvement therein."
The 1973 (sic) act changed it to 'any new and useful art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement on any
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter." The 1836 act, which
established the first Patent Office, retained the identical language. The
Consolidated Patent Act of 1870 (§ 24) simplified it to "any new and useful
art, machine, manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new and
useful improvement thereof," language which was repeated in the Revised
Statutes of 1874 (§ 4886) and which remained the same until 1952. The only
change in the wording made by the Patent Act of 1952-which was not a
change in substance-was the replacing of the word "art" by the word
"process" (§ 101) coupled with a new definition in § 100(b) stating: "The
term 'process' means process, art or method, and includes a new use of a
known process, machine, manufacture, composition of matter, or material," a mere modernization of language and a declaration of existing case
law.
545 F.2d at 159, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 736-37, 6 CLSR at 63-64 (Rich, J., dissenting).
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all-inclusive term "useful art."' 7 However, Section 100 confirmed the
fact that there was no intended change, since it defined process to
include "art."' 1 8 Thus, it would appear that the issue in every case is
still whether an invention is a "useful art." If an invention is not a
(modern) "process," it is not a (classic) "useful art," and therefore, not a
"machine." On the other hand, if an invention is a "useful art," it is then
a "process" and may also be a "machine."
The English language is unwieldy at best in describing technology.
Was Goodyear's invention the "process" of vulcanizing rubber, or the
"manufacture" of vulcanized rubber? Was Morse's invention the "process" of transmitting signals, or the telegraph "machine." It is simply
easier to describe the contribution, the newness of certain inventions, as
a process, or a machine, or a new use, depending upon the contribution
itself. The Patent Office has used these categories to classify inventions
for many years, and a large body of law has evolved as a consequence.
There is simply no reason for a decision on patentability to depend
upon whether an invention is described as a process or machine. If, as
Judges Rich and Lane believe, Benson proscribed all patents for program inventions, it necessarily prohibited patent coverage for programs, whether described as processes or machines. If, alternatively,
Benson merely held that the mental solution of a mathematical formula
is beyond the useful arts, it proscribed no invention within the useful
arts, whether called a process or a machine.
IV.

LEGISLATION-SOLUTION OR DILEMMA

The appeal to Congress in Benson for a legislative solution to the
question of whether software should be patentable' ° was re-echoed by
the majority in Chatfield with a curious reverse twist. The court in
Chatfield suggested that those who want to preclude the patenting of
software should submit proposals to Congress. 10 This was just the
reverse of Justice Douglas' invitation in Benson for Congress to
broaden statutory coverage to include "these programs.'''
The Benson opinion began conventionally enough, posing the question of whether the claimed method was a statutory "process. ' 1 2 It did
107. 35 U.S.C. § 101 (1970), reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
108. 35 U.S.C. § 100(b) (1970), reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
109. "If these programs are to be patentable, considerable problems are raised
which only committees of Congress can manage ...
" 409 U.S. 63, 73,175 U.S.P.Q.
673, 677, 3 CLSR 256, 263 (1972) (footnote omitted).
110. 545 F.2d 152, 156, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 734, 6 CLSR 52, 59 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465,6 CLSR 466 (1977). Such a proposal was, in fact,
submitted to Congress in 1967. Section 106, S. 1042, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967),
reprinted in the Appendix in this issue.
111. See note 109 supra.
112. 409 U.S. 63, 64, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 674, 3 CLSR 256, 257 (1972).
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not mention the constitutional provision, nor was there any suggestion
that the Court understood that a "process" might be the modern day
"useful art" as set forth in the Constitution. The opinion concluded, on
broad policy grounds, that the invention was not patentable." 3 The
Court held that Benson's invention was not a "process" and, by inference, was not a "useful art."
Thus, a proponent of legislation to permit software patents is faced
with a dilemma. If the Benson invitation for congressional expansion of
patent coverage was bona fide, then the policy arguments of that case
do not apply to "useful arts," which Congress has statutorially defined
as "processes." Yet, if these arguments take software outside "processes," they simultaneously take it outside "useful arts." Was not
Congress, however unintentionally, invited by the Benson Court to
perform either an unnecessary or unconstitutional act?

V. THE RULES SINCE BENSON
This section seeks to distill the "rule" of Benson, as delineated by
the various decisions of the C.C.P.A. The case analysis, however, illustrates the uncertainty of the court, both as to the holding of the Benson
and as to how the Benson holding should be applied to the variety of
program-related patent claims presented. Each interpretation of the
Benson "rule," as announced by the C.C.P.A., is set forth in brackets
following the case which enunciated that interpretation.
While a logical division of programs is into systems and applications software, n 4 this division does not aid in the analysis of program
patentability decisions in the C.C.P.A. since Benson. System inventions
have been found patentable in Chatfield,n 5 but unpatentable in Waldbaum.16 Application programs have been found patentable in Flook," 7
Noll,"

8

Deutsch"' and Johnston120 and unpatentable in Richman, 121 de

113. Id. at 71-72, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 676, 3 CLSR at 262.
114. "Systems software" performs some basic machine functions necessary
for all users regardless of the nature of their particular problems; "applications software" deals with a user's particular problem.
D. BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: EVIDENCE & PROCEDURE § 1.05[2], at 1-16.
115. 545 F.2d 152, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 6 CLSR 52 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert. denied, U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977).
116. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611,194 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
117. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 195 U.S.P.Q. 9, 6 CLSR 426 (C.C.P.A. 1977), rev'd,
Parker v. Flook, - U.S. -, No. 77-642 (June 22, 1978).
118. 545 F.2d 141, 191 U.S.P.Q. 721, 6 CLSR 69 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert denied, U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 465 (1977).
119. In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 193 U.S.P.Q. 645, 6 CLSR 408 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
120. In re Johnston, 502 F.2d 765, 183 U.S.P.Q. 172, 4 CLSR 1491 (C.C.P.A. 1974),
rev'd sub nom. Dann v. Johnston, 425 U.S. 219,189 U.S.P.Q. 257, 5 CLSR 1133 (1976).
121. In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 195 U.S.P.Q. 340 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
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Castalet,122 Waldbaum 123 and Christensen.124
Christensen 25 presented an invention for oil exploration. Specifically, one could determine subsurface porosity by filling a bore hole with
fluid, generating compression and shear waves, determining resultant
values, and then computing the porosity by use of a novel quadratic
equation. The court found that Benson prohibited patents where the
point of novelty is the solution of a mathematical equation as the last
step of the claimed method. 126 [Rule 1: Math as the last step is
unpatentable.]
A formula was the novel element in Flook.127 The process involved
updating the value of alarm limits in an oil refinery. The applicant
sought to distinguish Christensen on the ground that his calculation
was not the last step of the claim. However, the examiner and Board
rejected the application on the basis of Christensen.128 The C.C.P.A.
reversed the Board, finding the thrust of Christensen to be its exact
holding, and concluding that patentability was precluded only where
there was no post-solution activity. 29 The court also read Benson as
condemning only claims which "wholly pre-empt"' 3 ° use of the formula, i.e., where the solution per se would infringe. [Rule 2: Math alone is
unpatentable.]
The court was correct in observing that one could solve the equation for the new alarm limit without infringing the claim. The claim
clearly called for a last step of using the information (the new alarm
value) to adjust the control system. 3 ' However, the unanswered question which remained was whether the court properly interpreted the
"rule" of Benson.
Should a decisional rule of law be measured solely by the facts as
found by the court, or by indisputably inconsistent, evidentiary facts
appearing in the record? The rule of Benson, as stated by Flook,132 is
wholly consistent with the factual findings of the Benson Court. Yet, it
is quite inconsistent with the evidentiary facts in Benson. The Court in
Benson found that the claimed invention was a method of transforming
122. In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 195 U.S.P.Q. 439 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
123. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611,194 U.S.P.Q. 465,6 CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
124. In re Christensen, 478 F.2d 1392, 178 U.S.P.Q. 35,4 CLSR 66 (C.C.P.A. 1973).

125. Id.
126. Id. at 1394, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 37, 4 CLSR at 70. As is made quite clear in Judge
Rich's concurring opinion (Id. at 1395-96, 178 U.S.P.Q. at 38-39, 4 CLSR at 70-72
(Rich, J., concurring)), the court did not perceive the Supreme Court's Benson
ruling to be "limited," as the Supreme Court itself later stated. See note 62 supra
and accompanying text.
127. In re Flook, 559 F.2d 21, 22, 195 U.S.P.Q. 9,10, 6 CLSR 426, 427-28 (C.C.P.A.
1977), rev'd, Parker v. Flook, - U.S. -, No. 77-642 (June 22, 1978).
128. Id. at 22, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 10, 6 CLSR at 428.
129. Id. at 23, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 11, 6 CLSR at 429.
130. Id.
131. Id. at 22, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 10, 6 CLSR at 428.
132. See note 130 supra and accompanying text.
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BCD numerals to binary.1 33 If this were so, and Claim 13 can be read as
such,13 4 then anyone using the method in any context would infringe the
claim. However, the Court also found Claim 8 unpatentable. 3 5 Yet, the
only way to infringe Claim 8 was to perform the calculations on a "reentrant shift register." Doing them manually or using anything but a
re-entrant shift register would not infringe the claim.
The court in Flook did not explicitly state what it construed the
facts of Benson to be. A few months earlier, in Waldbaum,13 the
C.C.P.A. noted an argument by appellant's counsel that the Court in
Benson treated both claims together. 1 37 While refusing to comment on
the accuracy of that observation, the court stated that there was nothing in Benson to support that argument. 138 Even with its deficiencies,
the Flook gloss on Benson was at least an understandable rule. If one
could practice an inventive algorithm or formula without infringing the
claim, the claim was proper. That rule lasted exactly two months.
133. 409 U.S. at 63, 64, 175 U.S.P.Q. 673, 674, 3 CLSR 256, 256 (1972).
134. A data processing method for converting binary coded decimal number
representations into binary number representations comprising the steps
of(1) testing each binary digit position i, beginning with the least significant
binary digit position, of the most significant decimal digit representation
for a binary "0" or a binary "1";
(2) if a binary "0" is detected, repeating step (1) for the next least significant binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(3) if a binary "1" is detected, adding a binary "1" at the (i+ 1)th and (i+3)th
least significant binary digit positions of the next lesser significant decimal
digit representation, and repeating step (1) for the next least significant
binary digit position of said most significant decimal digit representation;
(4) upon exhausting the binary digit positions of said most significant
decimal digit representation, repeating steps (1) through (3) for the next
lesser significant decimal digit representation as modified by the previous
execution of steps (1) through (3); and,
(5) repeating steps (1) through (4) until the second least significant decimal
digit representation has been so processed.
Id. at 74, 175, U.S.P.Q. at 677, 3 CLSR at 264.
135. Claim 8 reads:
The method of converting signals from binary coded decimal form into
binary which comprises the steps of(1) storing the binary coded decimal signals in a re-entrant
shiftregister,
(2) shifting the signals to the right by at least three places, until there
is a binary "1" in the second position of said register.
(3) masking out said binary "1" in said second position of said register.
(4) adding a binary "1" to the first position of said register,
(5) shifting the signals to the left by two positions,
(6) adding a "1" to said first position, and
(7) shifting the signals to the right by at least three positions in preparation for a succeeding binary "1" in the second position of said register.
Id. at 73-74, 175 U.S.P.Q. at 677, 3 CLSR at 263-64.
136. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611,194 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 415 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
137. Id. at 616, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 469, 6 CLSR at 424.
138. Id.
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De Castelet's invention was a method of generating a curve, using
an algorithm and a computer to control either a milling or drafting
machine. The Board found that the claim recited "a machine environ'
ment, a particular art or a particular end use."139
The C.C.P.A. was
again forced to recast the rule in Benson. It found "practical application" to be the key, asserting that the Benson opinion did not find the
BCD-to-binary conversion in a data processing apparatus a "practical
application' ' 140 of the discovery, since the process had to use the information to achieve a result other than merely the solution of the equation. [Rule 3: The claim is unpatentable if there is no activity, i.e.,
practical application, following math.]
Implicit in Flook's method of adjusting the alarm limit was using
the new alarm limit. This presumably was the "post-solution activity"
of F/ook found lacking in de Castelet. Like Flook, the concluding step
of de Castelet was the transferring of a signal to a model forming
means, a milling machine or drawing machine.'
The claim did not
recite what the means did with the information once received. Indeed,
on a literal reading, the claims would be infringed if the means did
nothing with the signal. As such, the C.C.P.A. found that the claim was
directed to a process for solving a "set of mathematical equations per
se."'142 In an aside, the court suggested that a more explicit use of the
information in the last step would have altered the result. 143 Thus, the
rule of de Castelet may be nothing more than an exegesis of claims
drafting.
Two recent cases involved inventions which improved the operations of computers themselves. The invention in Chatfield improved the
priority allocations in a multi-programming system.14 4 Operations were
periodically measured during execution, and the programs causing bottlenecks were assigned a lower priority for the ensuing period. In Waldbaum, the invention was concerned with making a register function as a
45
counter. 1
Chatfield's main claim contained the steps of analyzing system
utilization and regulating resource access. 1 46 Remarkably, this was
found not to constitute an algorithm. 1 47 The dependent claims
139. In re de Castelet, 562 F.2d 1236, 1239, 195 U.S.P.Q. 439, 443 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
140. Id. at 1243, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 445.
141. Id. at 1239, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 442.
142. Id. at 1244, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 446.
143. Id. at 1244, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 446-47.
144. 545 F.2d 152, 154, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 732, 6 CLSR 52, 54 (C.C.P.A. 1976), cert.
denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977).
145. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611,612-13, 194 U.S.P.Q. 465, 465-66, 6 CLSR 415,
416-18 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
146. 545 F.2d 152, 154, 191 U.S.P.Q. 730, 732, 6 CLSR 52, 54-55 (C.C.P.A. 1976),
cert. denied, - U.S. -, 195 U.S.P.Q. 465, 6 CLSR 466 (1977).
147. Id. at 157, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 735, 6 CLSR at 60.
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contained explicit formulas.14 8 The rule, enunciated by the court, was
that the algorithm was not preempted, since the claim was not infringed
unless the entire claimed method was performed. 1 49 Expressed otherwise, if the algorithm may be performed without infringing the claim,
the claim is proper. In Benson, the Supreme Court was quite clear that
use in a computer was the only practical use of the algorithm; 5 ' and one
may assume the same could be said of Chatfield's invention. In Chatfield, however, there was more than the mere solution of an algorithm.
There was an additional step of "resuming the operation of the computing system"'' after the priority determination calculations. The Benson algorithm contained no such additional step.
Using the Chatfield test, it would appear that the Waldbaum
claims should have been approved. The Waldbaum invention was not
measured by that test. Rather, it was measured by two remarkably
inconsistent tests, enunciated for the first time as the "rules" of Benson.
First, the claim was found not limited to a practical application, and
therefore "abstract and sweeping' ' 5 2 and improper. Second, the53claim
was found to have no practical application except as disclosed.
Presumably either the first or second criticism could be leveled at
every invention. For years after its discovery the laser had virtually no
practical application; it was largely an exciting laboratory curiosity.
Today, new and unexpected uses are appearing daily. A claim to the
laser could have been rejected in 1958 under the second Waldbaum rule
and could be rejected in 1978 under the first Waldbaum rule.
The Waldbaum application also contained use claims for the proc54
ess of making a J-register count the busy lines in a telephone system.1
The "abstract and sweeping" scope of other claims was absent here. A
patent with these use claims would instruct competitors how to use the
invention and would reserve only one use to the inventor's assignee.
These claims, however, were also denied on the ground that they would
preempt the algorithm because no other use was disclosed.' 55
Like Benson, the holding in Waldbaum is clear. The rule, however,
is not. Should Waldbaum have disclosed another practical application
for counters? Is optimizing a multi-programming computer more practical and less sweeping and abstract than counting lines in a telephone
switching system? Did the court between November, 1976, and July,
1977, discover the real law, rule, or thrust of Benson?
148. Id. at 154, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 732-33, 6 CLSR at 55.

149. Id. at 158-59, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 736, 6 CLSR at 62.
150. See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
151. 545 F.2d at 154, 191 U.S.P.Q. at 732, 6 CLSR at 55.
152. In re Waldbaum, 559 F.2d 611, 616, 194 U.S.P.Q. 464, 469, 6 CLSR 415, 423

(C.C.P.A. 1977).
153. Id.
154. Id. at 612-14, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 465-67, 6 CLSR at 418.
155. Id. at 617, 194 U.S.P.Q. at 469-70, 6 CLSR at 425.
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Deutsch 15 6 was argued the same day as Waldbaum, but was decided considerably sooner and with the opposite result. Deutsch disclosed an optimizing system for a multi-plant refinery, whereby the
system is optimized less frequently than the individual plants. 151 As far
as the opinion indicates, the Deutsch process, as claimed, was the only
practical use of the disclosed algorithm; 158 no other use was disclosed.
However, the Waldbaum-Benson rule was not applied. Rather, the
C.C.P.A. held that the test of preemption was whether the algorithm
was freely available apart from the purpose claimed. 5 9 The court assumed that the answer was in the affirmative without stating whether
the other uses had to be known, practical, or within the technological
arts. This test is similar, if not identical, to that of Chatfield, and was
undoubtedly inspired by the court's observation that Deutsch's inven60
tion was further removed from Benson than Chatfield1
The invention in Deutsch differed from that in Benson, Chatfield
and Waldbaum in being an application rather than a system invention.
It also differed in two respects thought significant enough for the court
to note. First, it disclosed alternative enabling means. '6 Second, the file
contained an affidavit asserting that it was "fully conceivable" that 1the
62
technique could be employed on a hard-wired or analog computer.
Richman made a mathematical discovery. His claim, like Flook's,
was limited to a particular use, namely calculating a bore sight correction angle. 63 Like Flook, the use to which this information was put was
implicit, but suggested, by the disclosure of airborne radar. 64 Under
the Benson-Chatfield-Deutsch-Flook test there would have been no
preemption, since the algorithm was freely available except for airborne radar bore sight corrections. 6 5 That rule, however, was not mentioned.
The Richman process, which the court found both novel and unobvious, involved the acquisition of certain data. 166 The court could have,
but did not, observe that these novel steps placed Richman further from
Benson than either Chatfield or Deutsch. The court emphatically rejected the procedure of dissecting a claim into its old and new elements. 161 According to the court, it is no bar to a patent that the novel
156. In re Deutsch, 553 F.2d 689, 193 U.S.P.Q. 645, 6 CLSR 408 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
157. Id. at 690-91, 193 U.S.P.Q. at 646-47, 6 CLSR at 409-11.

158. Id. at 692-93, 193 U.S.P.Q. at 648-49, 6 CLSR at 413-14.
159.
160.
161.
162.
163.
164.
165.
166.
167.

Id. at 692, 193 U.S.P.Q. at 648, 6 CLSR at 413.
Id.
Id. at 693, 193 U.S.P.Q. at 648-49, 6 CLSR at 414.
Id.
In re Richman, 563 F.2d 1026, 1027, 195 U.S.P.Q. 340, 341 (C.C.P.A. 1977).
Id.
Id. at 1028, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 342.
Id, at 1029, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 343.
Id.
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step is a mathematical calculation. 1 68 A new test evolved: A claim is
unpatentable if it is directed "essentially" to a method of calculating.' 69
The court termed this the decisive factor. 17 0 It stated that neither the
inclusion or exclusion of a formula in the claim was determinative of
1 71
whether the claim was "essentially" a method of calculating.
The court was quite clear on what the Patent Office should say and
not say when, upon dissection of the claim, it found novelty solely in an
algorithm. 72 By implication, it found Richman's claim, and perhaps
Richman's entire invention, essentially a mathematical calculation.
Neither the claim nor the opinion stated exactly what Richman proposed to do with the correction factor for the depression angle. This
opinion was also classifiable as a lesson in claims drafting.
VI.

CONCLUSION

Perhaps an analogy to another area of law is useful. For over a
generation, the courts have expanded the thesis that no arguably innocent or unfairly treated person should be convicted of a crime. The
unintended effect of this philosophy on both perpetrators and victims
of crime, is now being recognized and a new balance is being sought.
Similarly, the first rules advanced to prevent overly broad software
protection have had the unintended side effect of factually stripping
protection from meritorious inventors.
It is unrealistic to think that any simple formulation will ensure
that every inventor receives exactly his due-no more, no less. It is not
unreasonable, however, to hope that the courts will recognize that the
patent system operates in the context of competing social interests, that
all inventions come in degrees, that a balance is better than a bias in the
governing rules, and that predictability is better than capriciousness in
the application of these rules to particular facts.
168. Id. at 1030, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 343.
169. Id.

170. Id. at 1030, 195 U.S.P.Q. at 344.
171. Id.
172. Id.

POSTSCRIPT: On June 22, 1978, the Supreme Court announced its decision in
Parkerv.Flook, reversing the C.C.P.A. by a vote of 6 to 3. Justice Steven's majority
opinion construed the Morse case to require the process, not the algorithm, to be
novel. It further asserted that post-solution activity was irrelevant, exalting form
over substance. It concluded that the present statute, in light of prior precedents,
prevented an expansion of protection. Justice Stewart's dissent found the claim
within prior precedent and asserted that the majority was breaking new ground by
importing novelty considerations into subject matter questions. [Ed. Note: A further discussion of this, and other major cases decided since publication of this issue,
will be contained in the first annual supplement.]

